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[8. F. No. 19672. In Bank. May 23, 1958.] 
Estate of HERBERT EDW ARD LAW, Deceased. WELLS 
FARGO BANK (a Corporation), as Executor, etc., Ap-
pellant, v. ROBERT C. KIRKWOOD, as State Con-
troller, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Taxation-Inheritance Taxation-Federal Estate Tax.-A pro-
vision in a will that inheritance and estate taxes should be 
paid "out of my residuary estate in the same manner as an ex-
pense of administration" and should not be apportioned, pro-
rated or charged against any of the devisees, legatees or bene-
ficiaries precluded proration of the federal estate tax under 
Prob. Code, §§ 970-977. 
[2] ld. - Inheritance Taxation - Valuation - Deductions. - The 
Legislature has the power to determine whether the wife's 
share of testator's separate property that is exempt from in-
heritance tax should be computed by subtracting all allowable 
deductions, ineluding the federal estate tax, from the market 
value of the entire estate and taking half the remainder as the 
marital exemption, or by subtracting only deductions other 
tban the federal estate tax from the market value of the en-
tire estate before taking half as the marital exemption. 
[3] ld.-Inheritance Taxation - Valuation - Deductions.-Under 
Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13805, declaring that "Property equal in 
amount to the clear market value of one-half of the decedent's 
separate property shall, if transferred to the spouse of the 
deeeased, be exempt from the [inheritanee] tax imposed," the 
marital exemption is limited to the lesser of two amounts, 
the amount "transferred to the spouse" and the amount of the 
"e1ear market value of one-half of the decedent's separate 
property." 
[4] ld.-Inheritance Taxation - Valuation - Deductions.-Under 
Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13805, defining the wife's share of tes-
tator's separate property tbat is exempt from inheritance tsx 
as property equal in amount-to the clear market value of one 
half of deeedent's separate property, the words "elear market 
value" are governed by tbe definitions in §§ 13311 (" 'Market 
value,' in respect to property included in any transfer, means 
tbe market value of tbe property as of the date of the trans-
feror's death, wbether or not tbe transfer was made during tbe 
life time of the transferor"), 13312 (" 'Clear market value' 
[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Inheritance and Gift Taxes, §§ 41, 55 et seq. 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Taxation, § 414; [2-11,13,14] Taxa-
tion, § 441(3); [12,15] Taxation, § 441(4). 
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means the market value of any property in any transfer, less 
any deductions allowable"}; if the Legislature had intended 
that JlO df'ductions should have been subtraoted, it would 
simply have used the words "market value" instead of "clear 
market value." 
[6] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-Valuation-DeductioDS.-Rev. & 
Tax. Code, § 13805, defining the wife's share of testator's sep-
arate property that is exempt from inheritance tax as property 
equal in amount to the clear market value of one half of de-
cedent's separate property, cannot reasonably be construed 
as meaning that deductions are allowable only to particular 
distributees, that the allowable deductions to be subtracted in 
arrh ing at the marital exemption must be the wife's allowable 
deductions, and that none of the federal estate tax should be 
subtracted fr<>m half the market value of decedent's separate 
property in arriving" at the marital exemption, since it is im-
material whether the allowable deductions are taken from the 
total market value of decedent's separate property or from 
half the market value so long as half the total deductions (the 
pro rata share thereof) are subtracted from each half of the 
market value of decedent's separate property to arrive at the 
clear market value of each half; since the clear market value 
of either half of decedent's separate property cannot be greater 
or less than the clear market value of the other half, the allow-
able deductions must be prorated equally to each half. 
[6] Id. - Inheritance Taxation - Valuation-DeductioDS.-Rev. & 
Tax. Code, § 13805, cannot reasonably be construed as provid-
ing that the allowable deductions to be subtracted in arriving 
at the marital exemption from inheritance tax must be the 
surviving spouse's allowable deductions, since the words "equal 
in amount" clearly show that the relationship between the 
"Property" that "shall • • • be exempt" and "the clear market 
value of one-half of the decedent's separate property" is 
purely quantitative and that it is immaterial whether· the 
property exempted is community or separate property or 
whether the separate property or any part thereof does or 
does not pass to the surviving spouse. 
[7] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-Valuation-DeductioDS.-Since in 
determining the marital exemption from inheritance tax it is 
immaterial whether or not the surviving spouse receives 
separate property, it is likewise immaterial what deductions 
may be allowed with respect to property the surviving spouse 
actually receives; there is no more reason for assuming that 
the deductions to be taken in determining the clear market 
value of one-half of decedent's separate property are the de-
ductions allowable to the surviving spouse than that they are 
the deductions allowable to other distributees. 
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[8] Id. - Inheritance Taxation - Valuation - Deductions. - The 
words "clear market value," as used in Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 13805, do not have a meaning restricted to specific distribu-
tees, since the quoted words mean "the market value of any 
property included in any transfer, less any deductions allow-
able" (§ 13312), "transfer" is defined in § 13304 as including 
"the passage of any property, or any interest therein or income 
therefrom, in possession or enjoyment, present or future, in 
trust or otherwise," and the sections that provide for deduc-
tions (§§ 13981-13990) state that the particular expenses "are 
deductible from the appraised value of property included in 
any transfer ••• made by the decedent." 
[9] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-V aluation-Deductions.-Under 18 
Cal. Admin. Code, §§ 837, 848, 849, which provide that the 
inheritance tax is "ordinarily" measured by the clear market 
value of the distributive share of a decedent's estate to which 
a particular transferee is entitled and provide for such compu-
tation, the clear market value of the entire estate would be 
determined and the tax computed with respect to each dis-
tributee's share of the net estate where the testator directed 
that all expenses, including federal estate tax, were to be paid 
from the estate and not prorated or charged to any of the 
beneficiaries; no deduction would be allowed to each distribu-
tee since the deductions would be allowed in determining the 
net estate (clear market value of the estate). 
[10] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-Valuation-DeductioDS.-Wben a 
testator-direm-that an expense is not to be charged to the 
individual beneficiaries but is to be charged against a part of 
the estate, the deduction for that expense should be allowed 
against that part and the tax on the beneficiaries of that part 
should be computed on their net share thereof. 
[11] Id. - Inheritance Taxation - Valuation-Deductions. - The 
Legislature's use of "clear market value" in Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 13805, plainly demonstrates that the phrase has meaning 
with respect to a certain part of the estate since it requires 
that the clear market value-be taken of one"half of decedent's 
separate property, whic!}. need not pass to a single distributee, 
i.e., the wife, but may actually pass to various distributees. 
[12] Id. - Inheritance Taxation - Valuation-Deductions.-Since 
the state statute provides for deduction of the federal estate 
tax in determining "clear market value," it must enter into the 
computation of the state marital exemption from inheritance 
tax, for that exemption is governed by the controlling words 
"clear market value" whose meaning is made to depend on 
allowable deductions. 
[13] Id. - Inheritance Taxation - Valuation - Deductions.-The 
state provisions relative to inheritance tax on the surviving 
) 
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spouse's share of decedent's separate property were not in- . 
tended to have the same consequences as the federal provisions, 
since the state provides for a marital exemption rather than a 
deduction. 
[14] ld. - Inheritance 'l'axation-Valuation-Deductions.-In en-
acting Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13805, the Legislature did not 
intend full equality in the tax treatment of separate prop-
erty and post-1927 community property, since § 13805 pro-
vides for an exemption rather than an exclusion and § 13312 
compels the consideration of federal estate tax as an allowable 
deduction. 
[16] ld.-Inheritance 'l'axation-Valuation-Deductions.-Rev. & 
Tax. Code, § 13805, is concerned with the computation of the 
marital exemption for state inheritance tax, not with which 
shares shall be charged with payment of the federal estate tax, 
and when the proration provisions apply only those bene-
ficiaries whose shares contributed to the creation of the federal 
estate tax will be charged with its payment j the proration 
provisions do not establish a policy that there shall be no state 
inheritance tax on any property qualifying for the federal 
marital deduction. 
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of the City 
and County of San Francisco overruling objections and fixing 
an inheritance tax. T. I. Fitzpatrick, Judge. Affirmed. 
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, Harold I. Boucher, W. J. 
McFarland, Claude H. Hogan, Jr., Willis D. Hannawalt and 
Arthur L. Content for Appellant. 
Robert C. Harris, Donald B. Falconer, Heller, Ehrman, 
White & McAuliffe, Jannin & Morgan and Boos, Jennings Ii; 
Haid as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellant. 
James W. Hickey, Chief Inheritance Tax Attorney, Joseph 
D. Lear and Charles J. Barry, Assistant Chief Inheritance I 
Tax Attorneys, and Milton D. Harris, Assistant Inheritance 
Tax Attorney. for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The executor of the estate of Herbert E. 
Law appeals from the orders of the trial court overruling its 
objections and :fixing the marital exemption under section 
13805 of the Revenue and Taxation Code at the amount com-
puted by the Controller. 
Decedent died testate on June 18, 1952. He left over half 
his estate to his wife, provided a legacy for an adopted daugh- • 
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ter, and left the residue in trust for other beneficiaries. 
[1] The will provided that inheritance and estate taxes 
should be paid •• out of my residuary estate in the same man-
ner as an expense of administration" and should not be ap-
portioned, prorated, or charged against any of the devisees, 
legatees, or beneficiaries. This provision precluded proration 
of the federal estate tax under sections 970 to 977 of the 
Probate Code. The market value of decedent's estate, which 
consisted solely of separate property, was $2,961,436.71. 
[2] The computations of the marital exemption contended 
for by the parties are as follows: 
Controller's Computation 
Market value of 
decedent's 





estate tax ... 491,005.67 
Take half of .. 2,470,431.04 
Executor's Computation 
Market value of 
decedent's 





tax .••..... 72,104.54 
Take half of .. 2,889,332.17 
Marital exemp- Marital exemp-
tion ........ . 1,235,215.52 tion ........ 1,444,666.08 
The difference in the computations arises· from the fact 
that the Controller subtracts all allowable deductions, in-
cluding the federal estate tax ($418,901.13). from the market 
value of the entire estate and takes half the remainder as the 
marital exemption, whereas the executor subtracts only de-
ductions other than the federal estate tax from the market 
value of the entire estate before taking half as the· marital 
exemption. The executor's computation increases the marital 
exemption as computed by the Controller by half the federal 
estate tax. The Legislature has the power to prescribe either 
computation. (Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U.S, 137, 144-145 [45 
S.Ct.424, 69 L.Ed. 884, 44 A.L.R. 1454] ; Estate of Watkin-
son, 191 Cal. 591, 596 [217 P. 1073].) The question is: What 
computation has it prescribed' 
[3] The answer depends upon the proper construction to 
be given section 13805 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. 
The pertinent part of that section provides: 
"Property equal in amount to the clear market value of one-
half of the decedent's separate property shall, if transferred 
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to the spouse of the deceased, be exempt from the tax imposed 
by t1us part .... " 
The marital exemption under this section, like the federal 
marital deduction (26 U.B.C.A., § 2056), is limited to the 
lesser of two amounts, the amount "transferred to the spouse" 
and the amount of the "clear market value of one-half of the 
decedent's separate property." The issue here concerns the 
second limitation, for the amount thereof under either the 
executor's or the controller's computation is less than the 
amount transferred to the spouse. 
[4] The controlling words in this limitation, "clear market 
value, " are governed by the definitions in sections 13311 and 
13312, for section 13302 provides: "Except where the context 
otherwise requires, the definitions given in this chapter gov-
ern the construction of this part." "This part" consists of 
part 8 entitled "Inheritance Tax" and includes sections 13301 
through 14901. Section 13311 provides: " 'Market value,' in 
respect to property included in any transfer, means the market 
value of the property as of the date of the transferor's death, 
whether or not the transfer was made during the life time 
of the transferor." Section 13312 provides: " , Clear market 
value' means the market value of any property included in 
any transfer, less any deductions allowable by this part." It 
is obvious at the outset that had the Legislature intended that 
no deductions should be subtracted, it would simply have used 
the words "market value" instead of "clear market value." 
It remains therefore to determine what the allowable deduc-
tions are and from what they should be deducted. 
The allowable deductions are set forth in sections 13981 to 
13990 and include such items as expenses of administration, 
debts, expenses of funeral and last illness, attorney's fees, and 
federal, estate lax (§ 13989). Since the federal estate tax 
is an allowable deduction, the Controller contends that in 
conformity with section 13312 it must be .subtracted from the 
market value of decedent's separate property to ascertain the 
clear market value thereof and that half the amount so ascer-
tained is "the clear market value of one-half of the decedent's 
separate property."1 
'If both community property and leparate property were included in 
the estate, only a pro rata share of allowable deductions would be sub· 
tracted by the Controller from the separate property to obtain the "clear 
market value" thereof. Since the entire estate herein consists of separate 
property, no prorating of allowable deductions between leparate and 
community property iI called for. 
) 
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The executor contends that the Controller's computation in-
volves an unauthorized transposition of the words of the 
statute from •• the clear market value of one-half of the dece-
dent's separate property" to "one-half of the clear market 
value of the decedent's separate property.'" Theexecutor's 
theory apparently is that the section as worded requires 
taking half the market value of decedent's separate property 
before subtracting the allowable deductions therefrom to 
arrive at the clear market value thereof under section 13312. 
The executor then contends, citing 18 Administrative Code, 
sections 837, 848, and 849, that clear market value has meaning 
only with respect to particular distributees and that deduc-
tions are allowable, not to the estate of a decedent, but only 
to particular distributees; that since the only beneficiary con-
cerned with the marital exemption is the wife, the allowable 
deductions to be subtracted in arriving at the marital exemp-
tion must be the wife's allowable deductions; and that since 
the wife in this case is not charged with payment of any 
federal estate tax because the decedent directed that it should 
be paid out of the residue and none of the residue went to the 
wife, she is not allowed any deduction therefor (§ 13981) and 
accordingly none of the federal estate tax should be subtracted 
from half the market value of decedent's ·separate property 
in arriving at the marital exemption. 
[6] Section 13805 cannot reasonably be construed to sup-
port the executor's contention. In the first place it is imma-
terial whether the allowable deductions are taken from the 
total market value of decedent's separate property or from 
half the market value thereof 80 long as half the total deduc~ 
tions (the pro rata share thereof) are subtracted from each 
half of the market value of decedent's separate property to 
arrive at the clear market value of each half. To arrive at 
the clear market valu~ of each half there is no more reason 
to subtract all the deductions from anyone half than there is 
to subtract all of them from -the other half. The two halves 
of any figure are necessarily equal. Therefore, since the clear 
-Aa atated in the brief of amici curiae, the executor'a ease lltanda or 
falla on the proposition that •• the clear market value of one-half of the 
decedent'. eparate property" means IOmething different from ., one-
half of the clear market value of the decedent'. separate property." The 
Controller contends that the result would be the same in either ease; 
that "the clear market value of one-half of the decedent's separate 
property" means the eame thing as "one-half of the clear market nlue 
of the decedent'a aeparate propert,.." 
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market value of either half of the decedent's separate property 
cannot be greater or less than the clear market value of the 
other half, the allowable deductions must be prorated equally 
to eaah half. 
[6] In the second place, section 13805 cannot reasonably i 
be construed as providing that the allowable deductions to be 
subtracted in arriving at the marital exemption must be the 
surviving spouse's allowable deductions. That section reads, 
•• Property equal in amount to the clear market value of 
one-half of the decedent's separate property shall, if trans-
ferred to the spouse of the deceased, be exempt from the tax 
imposed by this part. . .. " The words "equal in amount" 
clearly show that the relationship between the "Property" 
that "shall ... be exempt" and "the clear market value of 
one-half of the decedent's separate property" is purely quan-
titative and that it is immaterial whether the property 
exempted is community property or separate property or 
whether the separate property or any part thereof does or 
does not pass to the surviving spouse. The Controller parses 
the pertinent sentence in section 13805 to demonstrate the 
validity of this conclusion: The subject of the sentence is 
"Property." Stripped of its modifying clauses it reads, 
"Property ... shall ... be exempt from the tax imposed by 
this part." The first clause, "equal in amount to the clear 
market value of one-half of the decedent's separate property," 
modifies "Property" solely as to amount. The words, "equal 
in amount," establish a purely quantitative limitation. The 
second clause, ., if transferred to the spouse of the deceased, I, 
is qualitative and modifies the subject, "Property," and not 
the object of the first clause, "decedent's separate property." 
Under any interpretation permissible by simple rules of gram-
mar, the exemption extends to any type of property passing 
to the spouse, the amount to be limited to the clear market 
value of one-half of the decedent's separate property. 
[7] Since the second limitation on the marital exemption 
is a purely quantitative one and it is immaterial whether or 
not the surviving spouse receives separate property, it neces-
sarily follows that it is likewise immaterial what deductions 
may be allowed with respect to property the surviving spouse 
actually receives. There is no more reason for assuming that 
the deductions to be taken in determining the clear market 
value of one-half of the decedent's separate property are the 
deductions allowable to the surviving spouse than that they 
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are the deductions allowable to other distributees. I The under-
lying premise of the executor's contention, stated in various 
ways in his briefs and the briefs of amici curiae, is that the 
second limitation on the marital exemption is measured by the 
clear market value of one-half of the decedent's separate prop-
erty passing to the wife. If this premise were valid it would 
compel the disallowance of the marital exemption in many 
cases where none of the decedent's separate property passes 
to the surviving spouse. Thus, if the wife is to receive the 
decedent's share of the community property, there would be 
no marital exemption even though there was separate property 
in the estate passing to other distributees. Such a result 
would increase the tax burden of many surviving spouses in 
plain disregard of the statutory purpose to grant the marital 
exemption regardless of what type of property actually passes 
to the surviving spouse. 
If, as the executor contends, the phrase "allowable deduc-
tions" has meaning only with respect to specific distributees 
80 far as the federal estate tax deduction is concerned, it 
would have the same meaning so far as other deductions, such 
as administration expenses, are concerned. (Compare the 
wording of sections 13983, 13986, 13987, and 13988 with that 
of section 13989.) Thus, in the present case, since all expenses 
were paid from the residue, no deduction therefor would be 
allowed to the wife and none would be subtracted from the 
market value of half of decedent's separate property. The 
executor, however, does not contend that allowable deductions 
other than the federal estate tax should not be deducted in 
computing the marital exemption; indeed, it includes these 
other deductions in its own computation. 
• Assume that the deeedent's tuable estate eonsists of eommunity prop-
erty (decedent's ahare) of a market value of .200,000 and esparate 
property of a market value of .100,000; that the allowable deduetionll. 
including federal estate tax, total .60,000; that the will provides tbat the 
community property goes to deeedent'll wife, and one-balf the separate 
property goes to son Jobn an4 the otber half to daughter Mary; and 
that the will also provides that two-thirds of the expensell and death 
taxes are to be paid from the wife 'II share and one-sixth of sueb expenllell 
ill to be paid from eaeb half of the lIeparate property. ThUll $40,000 will 
be deductible by the wife and tlO,OOO will be deductible by each of the 
ehildren. It is readily apparent that neither the wife'lIlIbare (.200,000 of 
eommunity property) nor the allowable deductions with respeet thereto 
<.40,000) bear any logiesl relationship to "the elear market value of 
one-balf of the decedent's lIeparate property." It would be more reason-
able to assume that the "clear market value of one-half of the deec-
dent's esparate property" was the half going to son Jobn or to 
daugbter Mary less his or her allowable deductions. 
10 CM-II 
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[8] In the third place the executor's contention that the 
words "clear market value" have meaning only with respect 
to specific distributee!! is withont merit. Section 13312, as 
noted previously, states: " 'Clear market value' means the 
market value of any property included in any transfer, less 
any deductions allowable by this part." Note that this 
definition uses the phrase "any property included in any 
transfer." Transfer is defined in section 13304: •• 'Trans-
fer' includes the passage of any property, or any interest 
therein or income therefrom, in possession or enjoyment, 
present or future, in trust or otherwise." The sections that 
provide for deductions (§ § 13981-13990) state that the partic-
ular expenses "are deductible from the appraised value of 
property included in any transfer subject to this part made 
by the decedent." It is apparent that none of these sections 
support the theory that "clear market value" has meaning 
only with respect to specific distributees. [9] Nor do the 
sections of the Administrative Code (18 Cal. Admin. Code, 
§§ 837, 848, 849), cited by the executor, support such a theory. 
They merely provide that the inheritance tax is ordinarily 
measured by the clear market value of the distributive share 
of a decedent's estate to which a particular transferee is 
entitled and provide for such computation. In each sectioll. 
the word "ordinarily" is used. Under these sections the clear 
market value of the entire estate would be determined and the 
tax computed with respect to each distributee's share of the 
net estate where the testator directed that all expenses, includ-
ing federal estate tax, were to be paid from the estate and not 
prorated or charged to any of the beneficiaries. In such a 
case, no deduction would be allowed to each distributee since 
the deductions would be allowed in determining the net estate 
(clear market value of the estate). In fact, that result occurred 
in the present case, for the federal estate tax was paid from 
the residue and, in accordance with the decedent's will, was 
not charged or prorated against the individual beneficiaries, 
and accordingly, they were not allowed a deduction therefor. 
Thus, the clear market value of the property in the residue 
was determined and the state tax computed on each bene-
ficiary's share of the net residue. If the executor's theory 
that deductions are allowable only with respect to specific 
distributees were correct, the Controller improperly allowed 
a deduction for federal estate tax against the market value 
of property in the residue, for there are 18 beneficiaries of 
that residue under the will. No deduction can be allowed to 
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each beneficiary, for to do so would require that the expense 
be proratably charged to each beneficiary and a deduction 
allowed to each contrary to the terms of the will. The statutes 
do not require such a result and both reasun and justice dictate 
otherwise; [10] Thus, when a testator directs that an ex-
pense is not to be charged to the individual beneficiaries but 
is to be charged against a part of the estate, the deduction for 
that expense should be allowed against that part and the 
tax on the beneficiaries of that part should simply be com-
puted on their net share thereof. [11] The Legislature's 
use of the phrase "clear market value" in section 13805 
plainly demonstrates that that phrase has meaning with 
respect to a certain part of the estate for it requires that 
the clear market value be taken of one-half of decedent's 
separate property, which, as demonstrated previously, need 
not pass to a single distributee, i.e. the wife, but may actu-
ally pass to various distributees. 
The executor contends that its computation is supported 
by Estate of Cushing, 113 Ca1.App.2d 319, 332-334 [248 P.2d 
482]. That case held that in computing the "one-half of 
the community property which belongs and goes to the sur-
'riving wife, pursuant to Section 201 of the Probate Code" 
free of inheritance tax under section 13551 of the Revenue 
and Taxation Code, the federal estate tax should not be sub-
tracted with respect to post-1927 community property, i.e., 
community property acquired after the enactment of section 
161a of the Civil Code. The court in that case also held, 
however, that as to pre-1927 community property, the allow-
able deduction for federal estate tax should be subtracted 
in computing the wife's one-half that is free from inheritance 
tax, citing Estate of Atwell, 85 Ca1.App.2d 454,457-458 [193 
P.2d 519], which in turn cited and relied upon Estate of 
Coffee,19 Ca1.2d 248, 252-253 [120 P.2d 661]. 
In support of its contention th~· executor urges that part 
of the basis for the holding in .Estate of Cushing is that since 
there was no federal estate tax on post-1927 community prop-
t'rty, such property did not contribute to the federal tax, and, 
therefore, the federal estate tax was not subtracted in deter-
mining the wife's share free of inheritance tax. Because of 
the federal marital deduction, the executor concludes that the 
sam~ is true of the separate property in this case. The con-
tention is without merit, for the federal marital deduction 
'1lIAS allowed with respect to the pre-1927 community property 
in the Cushing case just as it was allowed with respect to the 
) 
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separate property in this case. The executor does not deny 
that for federal estate tax purposes, pre-1927 community 
property is treated in the same manner as separate property 
and that a federal marital deduction is allowed with respect 
thereto. 
The basis of the Cushing decision is stated on page 334 
(113 Cal.App.2d) as follows: 
"It follows from what has been said that the California 
statutes indicate that the widow's one-half of the post-1927 
community property, since it is not part of the 'gross estate' 
of the husband and is not liable for the federal estate tax, 
should not be charged, directly or indirectly, with any portion 
of the federal estate tax. This reasoning does not apply to 
pre-1927 community property, and, as to it, Estate 0/ Atwell is 
controlling. JJ That reasoning does not apply to the dece-
dent's separate property just as it does not apply to pre-1927 
community property, for both are treated alike for federal 
estate tax purposes and both are part of the decedent's" gross 
estate." Consequently, Estate 0/ Cushing supports the Con-
troller's and not the executor's contentions. 
The executor contends that section 13805 is modeled after 
the federal marital deduction and that to subtract federal 
taxes in computing the state marital exemption is to reach a 
result contrary to that reached under the federal statute. (26 
U.S.C.A., § 2056.) The state statute provides for the sub-
traction of allowable deductions by the use of the words" clear 
market value" just as the federal statute provides for their 
subtraction by the use of the words "adjusted gross estate," 
i.e., the gross estate less deductions allowed by sections 2053 
and 2054. (26 U.S.C.A., § 2056.) The difference is that the 
federal statute does not allow any deduction for federal 
estate tax or for state inheritance tax,' whereas the state does 
allow a deduction for federal estate tax. If the federal stat-
utes (26 U.S.C.A., §§ 2053-2054) provided for a deduction of 
either federal estate tax or state inheritance tax, such deduc-
tions would be made in determining the C C adjusted gross 
estate" and would therefore enter into the computation of 
the federal marital deduction. [12] Since the state statute I 
does provide for the deduction of the federal estate tax in 
determining II clear market value," it must therefore enter 
into the computation of the state marital exemption, for that 
exemption is governed by the controlling words CI clear market 
'A limited credit is allowed, however, for etate inheritance tax under 
26 U.S.O.A., t 2011. 
) 
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value" whose meaning is made to depend on allowable deduc-
tions. [13] Moreover, the state provisions were not intended 
to have the same consequences as the federal provisions, for 
the state provides for a marital exemption rather than a 
deduction. (Compare also the terminable interest rule in 26 
U.S.C.A., § 2056 with Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13805.) The differ-
ence is that the federal deduction comes oft the top of the 
tax brackets (26 U.S.C.A., §§ 2001, 2051), whereas the state 
marital exemption comes oft the bottom, i.e., the tax is com-
puted on the remainder of the property at the same rates that 
would have been applicable had the exemption not heen 
allowed. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13403; ct. § 13989 as amended 
in 1957.) 
[14] The executor contends that the Legislature intended 
substantial equality in the tax treatment of separate property 
and post-1927 community property and that such equality 
requires the exclusion of the federal estate tax from the 
allowable deductions in computing the marital exemption. The 
extent of such equality, however, must be determined by the 
statute. It is clear that full equality was not intended, for as 
mentioned above, section 13805 provides for an exemption 
rather than an exclusion and section 13312 compels the con-
sideration of federal estate tax as an allowable deduction. 
[15] The executor contends that the Controller's interpre-
tation of secp-on 13805 conflicts with the policy expressed in 
the proration provisions. (Prob. Code, §§ 970-977.) The 
proration provisions provide, when applicable, that the federal 
estate tax shall be equitably prorated against those benefici-
aries whose shares contributed· to the creation of such tax. 
Section 13805, however, is concerned with the computation of 
the. marital exemption for state inheritance tax and is Dot 
concerned with which shares shall be charged with the pay-
ment of the federal estate tax. Thus, when the proration 
provisions apply, only those ~neficiaries whose shares con-
tributed to the creation of the federal estate tax will be 
charged with the payment thereof. The proration provisions 
do Dot establish a policy that there shall be no state inherit-
ance tax on any property qualifying for the federal marital 
deduction. This conclusion is obvious Dot only from the 
nature of those provisions but from the fact that the proration 
provisions were enacted (1943) five years before the federal 
marital deduction provision was enacted (1948) and seven 
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Finally, amici curiae contend that the Controller's interpre-
tation of section 13805 is absurd because the identity of other 
legatees may affect the amount of the marital exemption. 
Examples are set forth in their brief to demonstrate this 
alleged absurdity by showing that when there are bequests to 
charities, the federal estate tax will be lower and the second 
limitation on the marital exemption will be higher. There 
is nothing absurd about this result, for it necessarily follows 
from the deduction allowed for the federal estate tax that the 
higher that tax is, the lower will be the net taxable estate 
subject to the state inheritance tax. Thus, if the estate· 
consisted of separate property valued at $15,000,000 and the 
only charge against it is a federal estate tax of $6,000,000, the 
net taxable estate subject to the state inheritance tax would be 
only $9,000,000, because a deduction is allowed for the federal 
estate tax just as deductions are allowed for administration 
expenses. Thus anything that reduces or augments the fed-
eral estate tax, whether it be the allowance or disallowance of 
exemptions, exclusions, charitable or other deductions, will 
reduce or augment the clear market value of the decedent's 
separate property. Moreover, the same result occurs with 
respect to pre-1927 community property under Estate of At-
well and Estate of Cushing, and would occur as well under the 
executor's theory when the wife's share is charged with the 
payment of all ()r a percentage of the federal estate tax. 
The orders are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-The statute which, by its ex-
press terms, should govern this case is section 13805 of the 
Revenue and Taxation Code. That section declares that 
"Property equal in amount to the clear market l1alue of one-
half of the decedent's ,eparate properly ,hall, if transferred 
to the spouse of the deceased, be eumpt from the tax imposed 
by this part ... " (Italics added.) I find nothing unclear in 
the language chosen by the Legislature. 
The computations of the executor are obedient to the stat-
ute. But the Controller, with the approval of a majority of 
this court, in effect amends the statute by changing the base 
of the exemption from the "clear market value of one-half of 
the decedent's separate property" to one-half of the value 
of such portion of the decedent's separate property as may 
) 
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remain after the federal estate tax shall katie been deducted 
from the value of the estate. 
This act, if regarded as legislative, obviously is in deroga-
tion of section 1 of article III of the California Constitution. 
If justification is sought on the theory that it is "judicial 
construction" it is equally indefensible, for the construction 
brings a result contrary to the interest of the taxpayer in 
violation of the oft reiterated principle that tax· statutes are 
to be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer and against 
the state. (County of Los Angeles v. Jones (1939), 13 Cal. 
2d 554, 561 [2] (90 P.2d 802], and authorities there cited; 
Whitmore v. Brown (1929),207 Cal. 473, 483 (279 P. 447].) 
The suggestion of the majority that the executor's theory 
could work adversely to the taxpayer in a totally different 
situation is not persuasive; it ignores the specificity of the 
situation which is before the court and assumes that in the 
different situation as well as in this one the court will con-
strue the applicable statutes in favor of the state and against 
the taxpayer. I would follow the contrary rule and give 
to the taxpayer the benefit of the doubt in any case wherein 
the legislative language was uncertain enough to admit of 
construction. 
It follows that the order from which the executor appeals 
should be reversed. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 17, 
1958. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
